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Abstract: 
 
The sovereign debt crisis that shook the euro zone and took the Brussels-based policy elites by 
surprise in 2010 was in many ways the logical consequence of the global financial crisis which 
started in the US housing market in 2007. The euro crisis has raised serious questions as to the 
original design and long-term viability of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as it 
was originally constructed in Maastricht in December 1991. Throughout 2010, Europe’s heads of 
state and their finance ministers cobbled together various ad hoc bail-out responses, first to solve 
the pending Greek default in the spring of 2010, and then to stave off Irish default in the autumn. 
In order to prevent Portugal, Spain, Italy, and others from falling down the same cliff, Germany 
and France agreed on a “permanent mechanism” to deal with future crises, to be formally 
approved in a European Council meeting in March 2011.  
 
This paper argues that – even though there were at least five crisis “narratives” of what had gone 
wrong with the euro zone and how it could be fixed – Germany’s narrative would ultimately 
prevail and German ordoliberal ideas rather than French-Mediterranean Keynesian ideas will 
inform the future institutional structure of the EMU. The paper argues that Germany’s stance 
prevailed in 2010 and 2011 because of the persuasive power of its economic ideas, rather than 
because of Germany’s abuse of its all-powerful position as Europe’s largest and most dynamic 
economy to push through reforms to serve their own national interests. The paper concludes that 
the German position is inherently unsustainable, however, but likely to prevail during the 
medium-term, forcing Europe on yet another lengthy period of austerity. In that sense, there is a 
German problem again, but not for the reasons most people believe. 
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The German question never dies. Instead, like a flu virus, it mutates. (The Economist)1 
 
If any good can come out of the Irish disaster it is via the realisation that the classic German 
perspective on the problems of the eurozone is mistaken. Any currency union among diverse 
economies is bound to be a risky venture. But, with mistaken ideas about how it should work, it 
may prove calamitous. (Martin Wolf)2 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction: Crisis and Uncertainty in 2008-2010. What Happened? 
The story of the 2008 global financial crisis is well known by now. It all started with the bursting 
of the mortgage debt bubble in the U.S. housing market in 2007. Once it was clear how a “global 
inverted pyramid of household and bank debt” was built on a narrow range of feeble American 
sub-prime mortgages, the “debt balloon started to deflate, at first slowly, [but] ultimately with 
devastating speed.”3 Banks soon stopped lending, both to each other and to their private 
customers, which caused a credit crunch in early 2008 and put an astonishing amount of pressure 
on the financial sector. 
 
Bear Stearns all but collapsed in March 2008, and was rescued by JP Morgan Chase, which was 
only convinced to buy the bank because of U.S. government support. By the summer of 2008 
commodity prices started to fall and giant American mortgage lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac were taken into public ownership.4 These events were part of the run up to the 
mindboggling events of September 2008, when the world economy was at the edge of the abyss 
and flirted with total collapse: Lehman Brothers fell down, Merrill Lynch narrowly avoided 
bankruptcy by dissolving into Bank of America, and big banks all over the world had to be 
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rescued by their governments, all in the midst of a U.S. presidential campaign. Stock markets 
plunged, and the financial crisis soon translated into a massive slide of the real economy, leading 
to falling output levels, rapidly increasing unemployment, and increasing savings resulting in a 
Keynesian liquidity trap. 
 
Talk of a new Great Depression was rife in the world’s major capitals. Only one thing was 
certain in the midst of the chaos: governments had to step in to rescue their banking systems and 
guarantee most of the deposits in those banks if they were to avoid an accelerated slide into a 
certain Great Depression. Central banks slashed interest rates to close to zero, and governments – 
in haste – put together fiscal stimulus packages of a magnitude unprecedented in peacetime. 
However, the world would be unable to avoid its first global contraction in output since World 
War II. The world economy shrank 1.1 percent in 2009, according to the IMF: the advanced 
economies contracted by 3.4 percent on an annual basis, while emerging and developing 
economies grew at a scant 1.7 percent in 2009.5 While it did steer clear of another Great 
Depression, the world was definitely grappling with a “Great Recession” and a fierce debate over 
what had caused the dramatic series of events leading up to it quickly entered into full swing. 
 
The initial focus of the financial crisis during the autumn of 2008 was on those countries with 
heavily developed and exposed financial sectors, mainly the United States and the United 
Kingdom. There was even some veiled schadenfreude in Continental Europe at the time, with 
economic and political elites in Paris and Berlin to some extent feeling vindicated. In their minds 
the crisis was laying bare all the shortcomings of the Anglo-Saxon model of financialized 
capitalism. In Britain, there was even brief talk of the missed opportunity of not having joined 
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Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union in the late 1990s.6 However, not for long: the crisis had 
quickly spread from the United States to Continental Europe and to the rest of the developed and 
developing world. In order to stem wholesale financial collapse, all advanced industrial states of 
the euro zone had passed unprecedented bailouts of their financial sectors and passed fiscal 
stimulus plans to stop the slide in the real economy. By mid-2009 it was clear that many 
governments in Europe – with the Southern European countries around the Mediterranean and 
Ireland in front (the PIIGS)7 – faced the consequences of a fiscal triple whammy. A collapse in 
government revenue due to the recession, a fast increase in spending due to rising unemployment 
and large stimulus bills, and the extra cost of taking on all the toxic private debt on the public 
sector balance sheet translated into ballooning budget deficits and sovereign debt. 
 
As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff remind us in their latest book, we should not be 
surprised that financial crises often lead to fiscal and sovereign debt crises.8 Yet, the financial 
markets somehow did seem surprised that governments, after having bailed out their financial 
sectors with an unmatched infusion of public money, found themselves with all the bad debt they 
had taken on from those private sectors. And as the initial focus of financial market participants 
shifted from private debt in 2008-2009 to sovereign debt in 2010, concerns about the long-term 
fiscal solvency of Europe’s periphery led to the collapse of confidence in PIIGS bonds and 
subsequent capital flight to safety. Bond traders sold risky Mediterranean sovereign debt and 
purchased perceived risk-free assets such as German Bunds and United States Treasuries. This 
led to a highly fluctuating euro-dollar exchange rate (figure 1, appendix) and widening sovereign 
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debt yield spreads (figure 2, appendix) within the Europe. Now, it was the rescuers who were in 
need of rescuing. 
 
Just like with the global financial crisis in 2008, there were multiple competing explanations or 
crisis narratives as to what caused the EMU sovereign debt crisis of 2010. The purpose of this 
paper is to explore those multiple competing narratives, weigh their respective merits, and 
explain why certain explanations and economic ideas won out over others, using a constructivist 
theoretical approach. I will argue in this paper that – even though there were at least five crisis 
“narratives” of what had gone wrong with the euro zone and how it could be fixed – Germany’s 
narrative would ultimately prevail and German ordoliberal ideas rather than French-
Mediterranean Keynesian ideas will inform the future institutional structure of the EMU. The 
paper argues that Germany’s stance prevailed in 2010 and 2011 because of the persuasive power 
of its economic ideas, rather than because of Germany’s abuse of its all-powerful position as 
Europe’s largest and most dynamic economy to push through reforms to serve their own national 
interests. This outcome will determine how the euro zone will be managed in the medium-term 
future. 
 
The next section will examine the five competing narratives of the 2010 EMU sovereign debt 
crisis. Section three will briefly lay out the constructivist theoretical framework that will be used 
in analyzing why certain ideas win out over others during periods of uncertainty, and explain 
why other, more “standard” explanations of political economy do not work as well in the case of 
the EMU crisis of 2010. Section four will review the European decision-making process during 
the Greek and Irish bail-outs in 2010, looking at whether the outcome of that process was 
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decided by German power, by EU institutions, or by the power of German economic ideas. 
Section five will look at whether the current solution to the EMU sovereign debt crisis is 
sustainable. Section six will draw the conclusions of this paper. 
 
2. What Kind of Crisis Was This? Competing Narratives. 
Once it was clear by the summer of 2010 that the EMU sovereign debt woes were not going to 
be limited to tiny Greece, multiple explanations emerged on what had caused the crisis in the 
first place. Some people argued that this was a crisis of design since Europe was not an optimum 
currency area, and had it coming all along. Others pointed to the high fiscal deficits and debt-to-
GDP ratios in Europe’s peripheral countries, pointing out its un-sustainability given its ageing 
populations. There were those who saw 2010 mainly as a crisis of competitiveness where slow, 
anemic and economic reform-resistant Southern Europe could no longer pretend to compete on 
an equal footing with a flexible, productive and fast-growing Northern Europe; and there were 
those who thought it was all due to integrated European capital markets and too high German 
savings, arguing that goods markets adjusted to capital flows and not vice versa. A minority view 
blamed inefficient financial markets and intra-European bond yield convergence hard to justify 
given the economic fundamentals of some countries. In this section, I will examine those 
competing crisis narratives one by one. 
 
The first explanation of the EMU sovereign debt crisis is Martin Feldstein’s view (probably 
shared by Milton Friedman if he were still alive) that this was a crisis of institutional design. The 
EMU of the original twelve EU members that introduced the euro in 2002 never was and never 
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will be an optimum currency area (OCA), so they had it coming all along.9 No monetary union 
has ever survived without a fiscal union, which would be needed in the case of asymmetric 
shocks, and thus political union. Furthermore, there is insufficient business cycle convergence, 
too little labor market mobility in EMU, while product and labor markets remain relatively rigid 
in Southern Europe compared to Northern Europe. In order to counter the OCA theorists, the 
European Commission put forward its theory of “endogeneity” in the 1990s, arguing that – 
theoretically – a currency union could be expected to increase trade and financial integration by a 
decrease in transaction costs and the elimination of exchange rate risk. Thus, increased trade and 
financial integration should lead to greater business cycle convergence, and thus a greater 
suitability of the participating countries for a currency union. This endogeneity thesis seems to 
have been overly optimistic, with the benefit of hindsight, if not dangerous, according to the first 
view, since it confused European dreams with reality.10  
 
The second explanation, partly associated with the German policy elite view, is that this is a 
budgetary or fiscal crisis. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), building on the Maastricht 
‘convergence criteria’ to join EMU, was far from “stupid” – as Romano Prodi once called it – 
but rather a good idea. The European Council’s trumping the European Commission’s power 
over a looming ‘excessive deficit procedure’ for France and Germany gave the green light for 
other members to do the same thing. Ignoring the SGP in 2003 as the Council of Ministers did 
thus let the genie out of the bottle, setting a dangerous precedent for smaller, peripheral countries 
that their fiscal profligacy would go unpunished. The result was widening public sector 
borrowing, and increased public spending, facilitated by an accommodating financial 
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environment (low interest rates) which made borrowing cheap and apparently low risk. 
Especially Southern European countries took advantage of the historically low interest rates – 
courtesy of Germany – to go on a public spending spree (see figures 3, 4, 5 and 6 in the 
appendix). Once the financial sector collapsed and needed a bail out in 2008, many governments, 
who were already deeply overleveraged, had to go deeper into debt to save their financial 
systems. This was in many ways the German nightmare scenario of the early 1990s: other EU 
members would free ride on German credibility and be able to borrow cheaply, hence 
undermining the credibility of the euro zone as a whole. 
 
The third explanation – the flip side of the German policy elite view – is that this is a crisis of 
competitiveness in Southern Europe. North-South divisions widened after the euro launch in 
1999, with labor costs widening and total factor productivity divergences pricing Mediterranean 
goods and services out of the European market. As the economies of Southern Europe and 
Ireland were booming in the early 2000s, wages tended to grow faster in those countries 
compared to their trade partners, especially Germany. The persistence of growth and inflation 
differentials across the EMU have therefore led to diverging movements in international 
competitiveness and strong trade imbalances within the euro area. Especially vis-à-vis Germany, 
real appreciations in the PIIGS countries led to their current account deficits (see figures 7, 8 and 
9 in the appendix). In this view, Germany is more competitive than the rest of Europe because of 
the painful reforms enacted under the Schröder governments in the early 2000s, wage restraint 
and high productivity.11 The introduction of the euro in 1999 took away all incentive in Southern 
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Europe to continue structural reforms, hence leading them to continue along their old bad ways, 
this narrative goes. 
 
The fourth explanation – the Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf view – is that this is a crisis 
of intra-European macroeconomic imbalances. Initial bond spreads in the 1990s allowed 
financial market participants to buy higher yield Mediterranean bonds and sell their lower yield 
Northern European bonds. This flooded Southern European countries with capital, fueling a 
cycle of housing booms and consumer spending, causing their current accounts (and goods 
markets) to adjust. The evidence for this view seems overwhelming. According to Eurostat, 
while Germany’s trade surplus with the rest of the EU was €46.4 billion in 2000, it had grown to 
€126.5 billion in 2007. Looking at the evolution of Germany’s bilateral trade surpluses with the 
Mediterranean countries, between 2000 and 2007 Greece’s annual deficit with Germany grew 
from €3 billion to €5.5 billion, Spain’s almost tripled from €11 billion to €27.2 billion, Italy’s 
doubled from €9.6 billion to €19.6 billion, and Portugal’s quadrupled from €1 billion to €4.2 
billion.12 Similarly, a recent IMF working paper by Claire Waysand, Kevin Ross, and John de 
Guzman on “European Financial Linkages” reveals Germany and France to be the two biggest 
net creditors within the Eurozone in 2008 with intra-Eurozone net investment positions of +€735 
and +€764 billion respectively, the exact mirror image of Portugal (–€136 billion), Greece (–
€199 billion), Italy (–€334 billion) and Spain (–€794 billion).13 So, it was the capital flows that 
attended nominal interest rate convergence in the late 1990s and early 2000s that caused the 
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current account divergences across Europe.14 We thus need to look at private capital flows and 
private debt in order to understand the EMU crisis. Since one country’s capital inflows are 
another’s capital outflows, the Eurozone cannot as a whole become more like Germany: since 
EMU members indirectly share liability for private sector debt, the SGP would have to be 
complemented with an ESP (“External Stability Pact”), according to this view. 
 
The fifth explanation, often ignored in the existing literature, is that this was a crisis of 
“efficient” financial markets. Interest rate convergence happened while financial markets were 
asleep: the EMU crisis would have never happened if financial markets had “correctly” priced 
the sovereign debt holdings of different European countries. As Jacob Kirkegaard from the 
Peterson Institute for International Economics has argued, the current high yields for certain 
countries mean a return back to “normal” as deficient policies are now met with instant default 
premiums. According to this view, governments should think twice before they try to please the 
markets: austerity as a response to spiraling debt is likely to make matters worse in the short run. 
If it is true that financial markets tend to under price risk during economic booms and over price 
it during recessions, why should we trust them next time? 
 
 
3. Theoretical Framework: The Central Role of Ideas during Crises 
Five different crisis narratives – some of which can be combined – imply five different crisis 
solutions. The main question is what factors ultimately determined which view would prevail 
during European economic decision-making in 2010 and 2011? Before I answer this question in 
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the next section, I will first take a brief step back in this section to discuss the “constructivist” 
theoretical framework which I used to analyze the EMU sovereign debt crisis, highlighting the 
central role of economic ideas during periods of uncertainty, which are needed in addition to the 
more standard “material” and “interest-based coalition” approaches I discuss first. 
 
a. Materialist and Interest-Coalition Approaches 
There are several important lines of analysis that have been developed to explain continuity and 
change in European economic policymaking. The key claims of two competing approaches 
suffice for the purposes of this paper: structural or “materialist” approaches and coalition or 
“interest group” approaches. This paper will be framed within a theoretical school that could be 
characterized as a “punctuated evolution” model. 
 
The structural or “materialist” approach is a particularly influential strand in the literature. This 
approach looks at the impact of an integrating world economy on economic policymaking. 
According to these structural explanations, it is “globalization” – the increased intensity of 
international trade, capital, and information flows – that drives a government’s economic policy 
decisions. Helen Milner and Robert Keohane spell out three pathways by which changes in the 
world economy have altered domestic politics over time: by creating new policy preferences and 
coalitions, by triggering domestic economic crises, and by undermining government control over 
macroeconomic policy.15 Jeffry Frieden and Ronald Rogowski argue that the sheer magnitude of 
international exchange flows have affected policies in virtually every country, as evidenced in 
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the “widespread repudiation of tax, regulatory and macroeconomic policies that inhibit 
international competitiveness.”16 
 
This literature emphasizes the importance of exogenous international shocks, such as the oil 
shocks in the 1970s or the liberalization of capital markets in the 1980s. One of the problems 
with this line of thinking is that the effect of the policy under discussion often precedes the 
supposed cause. For example, the liberalization of financial markets in Britain (or so-called “big 
bang”) did not trigger the Thatcherite experiment: it only happened in 1986, when Thatcher’s 
neoliberal policies were already well under way. Also, if one were to take materialist theories at 
face value they would point the way towards a convergence in national economic policies and 
institutions. Of course, one only needs to take a quick look to see the vast diversity in political 
economic arrangements all over Western Europe and North America. 
 
The second approach, that of coalition and interest group theories, seeks to explain how political 
alliances are formed and uses these alliances to explain the occurrence of continuity or change. 
In this view, political actors are driven by a desire to maximize their income share of the national 
(or European) economy, and coalitions emerge as a result of the tendency of socioeconomic 
groups to pursue their economic interests. Politicians are seen as the translators of societal 
pressures into policy choices. These politicians, however, do not play any major independent role 
in the process.17 The alliance choices of political actors are instead seen as predetermined by 
their respective positions in the international and domestic political economies. Therefore, the 
coalitions that eventually emerge in each country are the result of the particular economic logic 
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in that country at the time. For example, Gourevitch and Rogowski argue that the political 
alliances formed during the Great Depression of the 1930s were held together by shared 
economic goals and interests.18 In this domestic interest view, collective ideas are simply those 
notions put forward by the most powerful groups or individuals. If you push this to the extreme, 
ideas have, in Jeffrey Legro’s words, “no power to constrain groups, let alone constitute their 
interests.”19 In other words, according to this theory, understanding radical change in a country’s 
or region’s economic policy framework is a matter of understanding first how the relative power 
and interests of smaller groups within the state either shift or endure. New ideas are brought to 
the forefront by the rise and fall of these interest groups. 
 
Interest group theory explanations can be summarized in the framework developed by Jeffrey 
Frieden. His framework aims to identify the distributional consequences of increased 
international capital mobility, arguing that the intensified pace of capital flows across national 
borders has produced new sources of harmony and friction over how national economic policy is 
shaped. Tension arises between internationally oriented investors and firms on the one hand and 
domestically oriented ones on the other.20 These cleavages eventually play out in the policy 
arena, and the winning coalition is eventually able to convince the national government to pursue 
a specific economic policy agenda.21 This type of argument attributes the adoption of certain 
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economic models and policies to the pressures of powerful economic interests, which can alter 
due to the changing nature of the global economy.22 
 
The problem with coalition and interest group theories, as I argue later in the next subsection, is 
that economic and political interests are not directly perceived by political actors. Rather, these 
interests are perceived through the lens of the existing ideologies in different historical settings. 
What coalition and interest group theories cannot explain is what brings about the development 
let alone the change in interest perceptions in the first place. 
 
b. Constructivist Explanations 
Faced with a crisis, a policymaker will either turn to established rules of the game for direction 
or engage in radical reform. When it comes to economic policymaking this choice between 
continuity and change is fundamental, and yet fundamentally uncertain. While continuity entails 
using longstanding mechanisms to address economic problems, change introduces innovative 
ideas that establish new norms. 
 
In my book, Ideas and Economic Crises in Britain from Attlee to Blair, I problematized the 
notion of economic crises as self-apparent and material phenomena.23 Building on the work of 
Mark Blyth and Colin Hay, I argued that we need to look at crises as political constructions that 
require decisive interventions.24 During the social construction of a crisis, the movement of the 
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data by itself is not always as important as the “narration” of the movement in the data. What 
exactly defines whether a moment in time constitutes a crisis in need of a decisive intervention is 
delimited by the stock of available economic ideas. And here, it would be wrong to see economic 
ideas as mere technical knowledge or a simple correspondence theory of the world. Rather, they 
are seen as what one could call “simplifying devices” politicians use in moments of uncertainty 
to define “what exactly has gone wrong” and “what to do in order to fix it.” 
 
Thus at the center of my analysis is the concept of economic “crisis,” and how it is experienced, 
narrated, and explained by the different parts of the political elite to the society at large. I have 
argued that the ability of political actors to construct a convincing narrative of the causes of a 
crisis is of critical significance and ultimately shapes their capacity to change prevailing popular 
and elite views of the political and economic context. If political entrepreneurs prove successful 
in doing exactly that – i.e. persuade a sufficient majority of the merits of their solutions out of an 
economic or political impasse – they will create the necessary conditions for a change in the pre-
existing institutional arrangement. 
 
 
4. Crafting a Common European Response to the 2010 Sovereign Debt Crisis: 
Powering, Puzzling or Persuading? 
The five different explanations of the 2010 EMU crisis I discussed in section two of this paper 
are all plausible to some extent and probably should all be addressed if the euro zone wants to 
emerge stronger out of its current shambles and avoid a similar crisis in the future. However, as 
is always the case, some explanations are more plausible than others. There is no doubt that 
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Greece and Portugal suffered from more chronically weak public finances, while Spain and 
Ireland had very healthy fiscal positions for the past ten years, but saw their booms being 
financed with unsustainable inflows of private capital. The competitiveness argument applies to 
the whole Mediterranean, but definitely not to Ireland.  
 
Given the environment of high uncertainty, the crisis narrative is just as important as the 
objective facts themselves, and to understand the solution to the crisis, we need to look at how 
the European Union has responded in 2010 and which economic ideas have informed those 
decisions and why. Throughout the spring of 2010, there was constant tension on how to solve 
the crisis between two opposing camps. On the one hand there was what I call a “French-
Mediterranean” Keynesian view which emphasized growth, a European economic government, 
the need to avoid IMF involvement at all cost, and arguing that similar crises in the future should 
always be solved by political actors. On the other hand, there was the ‘German’ Ordoliberal 
view, which emphasized price stability and national fiscal discipline, the need for IMF 
conditionality and technical assistance for any bail-out, and quasi-automatic rules to deal with 
similar crises in the future. 
 
The Greek crisis was finally solved with an EU rescue package in May 2010 after months of 
uncoordinated and fragmented crisis meetings at the European level. Angela Merkel was the 
central person in those meetings, and she stated before that she would resist turning the euro 
zone from an economic and monetary union into a “transfer union.”25 On 9 May 2010, a rescue 
package of €750 billion was put together by all 27 member states of the European Union and the 
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International Monetary Fund. The rescue plan consisted of €440 billion euro zone-backed loan 
guarantees for stricken euro zone members raised by a newly created (and AAA rated) European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF); a European Union balance of payment facility totalling €60 
billion to raise debt by the European Commission using the EU budget as collateral; and €250 
billion loans from the International Monetary Fund. Furthermore, the ECB promised to intervene 
in public and private debt markets, and take extra measures to boost euro zone bank liquidity. 
 
Furthermore, during the European Council meeting in Brussels in late October 2010, in the midst 
of the Irish crisis, the EU heads of state agreed to amend the Lisbon Treaty in three significant 
ways. First, the EU would create a new macro-economic surveillance network to detect emerging 
imbalances and risks, including divergences in competitiveness. Second, EU leaders agreed to 
strengthen national governments’ fiscal responsibility under a stronger Stability and Growth 
Pact: from now on, progressive sanctions may kick in earlier in the budgetary surveillance 
process, and public debt will also be taken into account, alongside the existing deficit criterion, 
in determining whether EMU members are abiding by the rules. Third, the establishment of a 
permanent crisis mechanism was proposed to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area. 
EU Council President Herman Van Rompuy committed himself to open consultations with the 
member states on a limited treaty change required to establish such a mechanism. The final deal 
is supposed to be sealed during a special European Council meeting in March 2011. 
 
In many ways, it is remarkable how the two main “German” explanations of the crisis – fiscal 
profligacy combined with a lack of competitiveness – have informed European decision making 
in 2010. The establishment of the EFSF as well as the German demand for “amending” the 
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Lisbon Treaty meant that the German view of fiscal austerity would prevail, even though this 
hardly solves all the problems. Why the German view prevailed can be analyzed from the classic 
“interests, institutions, ideas” troika. 
 
Many observers, especially in the financial press, have concluded that Germany was “powering” 
its way through European Council meetings and using its influential position of economic 
strength to bully its European partners. From that point of view, the German problem – dormant 
for sixty years – is back with a vengeance, and a new generation of German leaders, with no 
sense of historic guilt for World War II, sees their country as a “normal” country with legitimate 
domestic and national interests. German solidarity with the European Union thus has its limits 
and the current crisis is nothing more than the country finally flexing its economic muscle. As 
tempting as this explanation may be, the reality is much more complicated than that. As is clear 
from the minutes of European Council meetings, Germany does not “run Europe” or impose its 
will on its fellow euro zone members – like some kind of Diktat from Berlin. Rather, it uses its 
powerful position as Europe’s “indispensable economy” to persuade their European partners 
during the decision-making process of puzzling a solution together that their ideas are ultimately 
the right ones. The fact that their economy had seen the fastest quarter-on-quarter economic 
growth in 2010 since reunification and that business confidence in the country was at record 
highs obviously only strengthened the German view that their anti-Keynesian austerity approach 
to their domestic economy had been right along.26  
 
As both the Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times reported this year, the initial European 
crisis solution was “puzzled” together in a series of messy, panicky meetings at the level of the 
                                                 
26
 As Sheri Berman argued in a Georgetown workshop paper in December 2010, “the German Sonderweg.” 
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euro zone’s finance ministers in Washington and Brussels during the spring of 2010.27 Those 
accounts would seem to suggest that the final outcome to the Greek crisis in May 2010 was a 
careful compromise between the major European players with help from the IMF and the 
Americans. It also shows that the EU bureaucracy works quite well, given their lack of 
experience in dealing with real time financial crises. In other words: the institutional response in 
Brussels to the sovereign debt crisis set in motion by a series of meetings at the EU level, 
cobbled together the solution. But the Maastricht Treaty did not have an instruction sheet on how 
to deal with the crisis, given the no bail out clause. In other words, existing European institutions 
were unable to deal with the sovereign debt crisis. It was simply not in the script. So, in order to 
explain the outcome of the crisis, EU institutions have been a facilitator at best. And Germany 
still seems to be the “linchpin” part of the jigsaw puzzle, without which any solution would have 
been elusive. 
 
I would argue that Germany had the most convincing crisis narrative. Of course, the Germans are 
all too aware that their own well-being is bound up with the fate of the euro. But, even more so, 
the euro zone’s fate is bound up with Germany. And given Germany’s banks’ heavy exposure to 
Greek, Irish, Portuguese and Spanish bonds – and the calamity its default would cause to the 
German economy – Germany saved Greece and Ireland partly to save itself, just as it is likely to 
save other EMU members. In the case of Greece, Germany did so against huge popular 
discontent at home, where the German voters seemed to assume that they were paying the bill for 
                                                 
27
 See the Financial Times’ three-part series by Tony Barber: (1) The euro: Dinner on the edge of the abyss (10 
October 2010); (2) Saving the euro: Tall ambition, flawed foundations (11 October 2010); (3) Saving the euro: 
Bound towards a tense future (12 October 2010). (London: Financial Times). Also, see the Wall Street Journal’s 
two-part series by Marcus Walker, Charles Forelle and Brian Blackstone: (1) On the Secret Committee to Save the 
Euro, a Dangerous Divide (24 September 2010); (2) Currency Union Teetering: ‘Mr. Euro’ Is Forced to Act (27 
September 2010). (New York: The Wall Street Journal) 
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a Mediterranean party they were never invited to. So, naturally, without strict conditions on 
profligate states and the imposition of losses on risk-happy creditors, all other EMU members 
would be taking free rides on Germany. Even though critics rightly pointed out that a formal debt 
restructuring mechanism would raise the cost of borrowing in the PIIGS countries and frighten 
already skittish markets in the short term, once Angela Merkel convinced Nicolas Sarkozy that 
Germany had the better argument, the others could not do anything else but grudgingly agree. 
 
 
5. The Limits to the German Response in Europe: Restoring (G)local Imbalances in 
the G20 and Europe’s EMU 
However, the point remains that the current EU proposals for a formal debt restructuring 
mechanism might go a long way to calm the markets in the short term; they do not solve many of 
the crisis’ fundamental and underlying problems. In the case of Ireland for example, it is hard to 
understand why a fiscally sound country which had slashed public spending and public sector 
wages in response to the 2008 financial crisis could solve a banking crisis with more austerity 
measures. Yet, that is what they have to do. It is simply impossible for the rest of Europe to 
become more like Germany if the whole point is that Germany could only be Germany because 
the others were not. Any current account surplus means that another country has a current 
account deficit. If Germany wants the euro zone as a whole to become more like Germany, this 
would only exacerbate the existing global macroeconomic imbalances. 
 
It is interesting how the 2008 global financial crisis and the 2010 EMU sovereign debt crisis saw 
two dormant economic powers rise to the fore in the battle for economic ideas: China in the G-20 
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and Germany in the European Union. This has been a long time in the making – at least for 
twenty years – and the similarities between both countries’ positions are striking. China and 
Germany have both always been skeptics of the Anglo-Saxon model of short-term finance 
capitalism, and their economic models – based on robust export growth and long term 
investment in the real economy (read manufacturing) – have weathered the financial storm of the 
past three years remarkably well. What matters here is not so much the real data in both 
economies – even though impressive if you choose the right indicators – but the perceptions of 
the policy elites in both countries which have them convinced that they had it right all along.28 
 
At the heart of the global financial crisis is the emergence over the past ten years of so-called 
“global macroeconomic imbalances.” Ever since Guido Mantega, Brazil’s Finance Minister, 
commented in Sao Paulo in late September 2010 that “we are in the midst of an international 
currency war,” the focus of most analysts shifted from praising the G-20’s efforts at international 
cooperation to growing tensions and fault lines between the institution’s main protagonists China 
and the United States.  
 
The central issue is whether the main cause of the world’s macroeconomic imbalances – a large 
US current account deficit and large current account surpluses in China, Japan and Germany – is 
a global savings glut in Europe and Asia, or deficient savings and too loose monetary policy in 
the United States. Recent developments only seem to make a bad situation worse: the United 
States claims that China is prolonging and worsening global imbalances by deliberately keeping 
its currency, the renminbi, undervalued vis-à-vis the dollar, while the Chinese point to the US 
                                                 
28
 There is no doubt that the German banking sector faces serious problems and that its exports were fuelled by easy 
money in Europe’s periphery. Compared to Germany, the Chinese economy’s challenges seem enormous, with a 
risk of inflation and the effects of an ageing population just the top of the iceberg. 
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Federal Reserve’s fresh round of quantitative easing (a policy Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany’s 
Finance Minster, has called “clueless”), which pushes down long term interest rates and fuels 
speculative capital flows into the emerging markets, forcing them to respond with short-term 
protectionist measures. China argues the US should take austerity measures while the US argues 
that China should stimulate domestic demand and allow its currency to float. Since there was no 
agreement reached during the recent G-20 meeting in Seoul on how exactly to deal with global 
imbalances, apart from vague commitments to “mutual assessment processes,” this has 
reinforced the sense of malaise in the global economy. 
 
All comparisons are flawed, but without too much of a stretch of the imagination, you can see a 
mini-version of the global economic scene being played out within the euro zone, with 
“competitive” export-led Germany playing the role of China and the “profligate” spendthrift 
Mediterranean countries of Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy, as well as former Celtic “Tiger” 
Ireland, playing the role of the United States. 
 
The euro lesson for the world economy – and the G-20 – is clear. If the world wants to avoid 
another 2008-style debacle, the ideological debate needs to change as much as the fiscal 
parameters. If the US slashes its own budget deficit and stops quantitative easing, as the Chinese 
are suggesting, we risk deflation on the global level. If the EU periphery is forced to constrict, 
then we compound the global error on the local level. China, just like Germany in Europe, will 
need to respond to fiscal austerity abroad with an accommodating demand stimulus at home, and 
allow other countries to rebalance their economies, especially their trade balances. Europe is the 
meso-level compliment to the macro-level problem of the world economy. And while the first 
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one is acknowledged, the second one does not even seem to register; at least not in Brussels, and 
definitely not in Berlin. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has argued that, even though there were at least five crisis “narratives” of what had 
gone wrong with the euro zone and how it could be fixed in 2010, Germany’s narrative would 
ultimately prevail and German ordoliberal ideas rather than French-Mediterranean Keynesian 
ideas would inform the future institutional structure of the EMU. I argued that Germany’s stance 
prevailed in 2010 and 2011 because of the persuasive power of its economic ideas, rather than 
because of Germany’s abuse of its all-powerful position as Europe’s largest and most dynamic 
economy to push through reforms to serve their own national interests.  
 
The paper concludes that the German position is inherently unsustainable, however, but likely to 
prevail during the medium-term, forcing Europe on yet another lengthy period of austerity. In 
that sense, there is a German problem again, but not for the reasons most people believe. 
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Figure 1: The Euro-Dollar Exchange Rate and Bloomberg European Composite Stock Market 
Index (December 2009
 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
-October 2010) 
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Figure 2: European 10 Year Government Bond Spreads (1995-2010): Selected Countries 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
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Figure 3: Annual Growth of Government Expenditures (Selected Countries, 1997-2007) 
 
 
 
Source: OECD, Eurostat, own calculations 
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Figure 4: Increase in Overall Government Expenditure’s Share of GDP 
 
 
 
Source: OECD, Eurostat, own calculations 
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Source: OECD, Eurostat, own calculations 
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Source: OECD, Eurostat, own calculations 
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Figure 7: Europe: GDP Growth (Selected Countries, 1990-2010) 
 
 
 
Source: OECD, Eurostat, own calculations 
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Figure 8: Evolution of Current Account Balances as a % of GDP (Selected Countries, 1990-
2009) 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD, Eurostat, own calculations 
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Figure 9: Evolution of European Labor Costs (Selected Countries, 1985-2007) 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD, Eurostat, own calculations 
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